The Warren Court:
Rediscovering the Link
Between Law and Culture*
Morton J. Horwitzt
Europeans frequently observe that there has always been an
absence of concern with political culture in the Anglo-American intellectual tradition. This is not strictly so. It is true that the triumph of Benthamism in the political and legal thought of nineteenth century England was accomplished by defeating historical
and prescriptive modes of thought and elevating abstract universalism to the forefront.' Yet, Burke's own attack on the abstract
universalism of the French Revolution2 was itself put forth in the
name of culture, history and prescription. In nineteenth century
England, attention to the concrete, to the particular-to context,
social custom, and the weight of history-was put forth by conservatism against the Party of Reform.3 It was the essence of Sir
Henry Maine's attack on Benthamism. 4 Maine's turn to legal anthropology was offered for the purpose of developing a Darwinian
theory of evolutionary customary law as an alternative to the abstract universalism of Benthamism. In the practical politics of
nineteenth century English law reform, social engineering through
parliamentary legislation became the chosen path of reform while
control of common law modes of thought continued to be the turf
of Blackstonian and Burkean conservatism.5
On the Continent, attention to political culture was initially
rooted in the prescriptive or customary claims of the seventeenth
century aristocracy in reaction to the centralizing absolute monar* Copyright 1988 by Morton J. Horowitz.
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chy.e These eventually blended into the eighteenth century development of ideas of republican government as an alternative to absolute monarchy. Montesquieu looked back to Machiavelli and the
ancients as a source of ideas for understanding how social conditions affect the character of governmental institutions.7
But the results of the French Revolution showed the indeterminacy of any close correlation between political culture and politics. The French Revolution shattered any easy identification of existing society with the natural order of things and, for a time,
revealed, as all revolutions reveal, the contingent and socially constructed character of political institutions. As in England, the
party of middle class reform largely turned to abstract universalism in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Kantian philosophy." The Monarchist Party of Reaction turned to history and prescription. And the Socialists discovered political sociology.9
One of the most striking features of mainstream American legal and political thought has been its lack of attention to political
culture or to the social basis of politics.

' Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints 68-92 (1965) (discussing the French
Huguenots); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 81 Yale L.J. 1017, 1025
(1981) (seventeenth century lawyers relegated "natural-law thinking" to "the margins of
elite legal thought by shifting the center of study to positive law-the specific legal practices
of actual societies" and developed "a self-consciously inductive method for deriving legal
principles from experience") (footnote omitted).
7Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Hafner Press ed. 1949). For an example of direct recourse by Montesquieu to Machiavelli and the ancients, see id at 1:76-79.
s This reading of Kant, which is surely the way it "turned out," is itself contingent.
Kant was inspired by Rousseau. Ernst Cassirer, The Question of John Jacques Rousseau 58
(Peter Gay trans. 1954). Rousseau's contemporary, Diderot, in his Encyclopedia, represented another strand that combined sociology and practical utilitarianism. Arthur M. Wilson, Diderot: The Testing Years, 1713-1759 73-82 (1957). After Montesquieu, Rousseau is
arguably the other eighteenth century French thinker who turned to political culture to
understand politics. Itmile Durkheim, Montesquieu et Rousseau: Pr~curseurs de la Sociologie 196-97 (1953). Tocqueville himself wrote in an 1836 letter, "[t]here are three men with
whom I commune a little every day; they are Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau." Quoted
in Richard Herr, Tocqueville and the Old Regime 48 (1962).
In short, Kantian abstract universalism is not inherent in Kant but was itself a creature
of nineteenth century liberal political culture as it reacted to the more radical sociologicalhistorical method of Hegel.
' In this brief sketch, I could not begin to prove this proposition. Clearly, the official
"founder" of political sociology, Auguste Comte, was not a Socialist. His influence was on
Saint Simon and Fourier, two of the founders of Socialism. Comte's relation to Socialism is
similar to Hegel's relationship to Marxism. Both Comte and Hegel were led to sociological
and historical modes of thought by conservative impulses. But because their genius transcended their immediate politics, their method was available to socialist and reactionary
alike. Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective 97-103 (1986). See generally, Raymond Aron, 1 Main Currents In Sociological
Thought (1965).
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In The Liberal Tradition in America,0 Louis Hartz argued

that the "turn to society" of post-French revolutionary European
-social thought was the product of a dialogue between a reactionary
tradition, which sought to return to a feudal society composed of
fixed statuses and hierarchies, and of an emergent Socialism, which
focused on the "social question" in order to transform society. For
Hartz, the explanation of why there was no American Tocqueville
was the absence of a feudal, pre-liberal tradition in America.
The recent rediscovery of a Republican (as opposed to a Lockean liberal) tradition" in American revolutionary thought means
that there was a clear alternative non-feudal intellectual tradition,
before Socialism, that focused on political culture or on the social
basis of politics. Though there are clear connections between early
Republicanism and medieval conceptions of fixed statuses and hierarchies, one of the central recent historiographical discoveries is
how these ideas were transformed during the American revolutionary debates into an indigenous American Republicanism., 3 Indeed,
Tocqueville's fascination with American society derived from his
own discovery of previously undreamed
of Republican possibilities
14
being actualized in America.
Hartz's failure to see that there was a real post-feudal alternative to a radically individualistic Lockean liberalism was itself a
latter-day reflection of the defeat of Republican ideology during
the nineteenth century and its marginalization into utopian communalism,1 5 abolitionism, 1 6 labor protest,17 populism'8 or social
gospel Christianity. 9
10Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955). For the points discussed below, see id. at 6, 78.
1 Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism And Liberalism In American Constitutional
Thought, 29 Win. & Mary L.Rev. 57, 58 n.7 (1987) (citing works on Republican tradition).
12 Frank I. Michelman, Foreward: Traces Of Self-Government, 100 Harv.L.Rev. 4, 37
and nn.184, 185 (1986).
"1 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 567-92 (1969)
("The Relevance and Irrelevance of John Adams").
" Morton J. Horwitz, Tocqueville and the Tyranny of the Majority, 28 Rev.Pol. 293,
295 (1966).
" Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and Community- Communes and Utopias in
Sociological Perspective (1972).
16Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party
Before the Civil War 302-304 (1970).
17Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 237-48 (1984).
18 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: the Populist Movement in America (1976).
Sydney E. AhIstrom, A Religious History of the American People 785-804, 921-23
(1972).
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But the greatest casualty of the lost tradition was that it produced a widespread belief that disembodied post-Benthamite philosophy was most naturally suited to the Anglo-Saxon character.
Yet, once we see that not only was Adam Smith an important part
of the Republican tradition from Montesquieu to Tocqueville, e
but that many Americans after 1776 were themselves interested in
"the social question"--the relationship between social equality and
political equality-we are in a position to realize that, in 1789,
there were many potential Tocquevilles in America and that Tocqueville himself enriched his own understanding of Republicanism
during his trip to America. Thomas Jefferson's ideal of a relatively
equal society of yeoman farmers as the most desirable social basis
of a free society found many theoretical formulations during the
revolutionary era. The dominant discussion during the debates
over the ratification of the Constitution about whether there could
be free government over a large territory21 was closely connected to
traditional Republican belief in the necessity of a relatively equal
and homogeneous society that might produce civic virtue.
The entire prior history of Republican thought was based on
the assumption that only small Republics-whether the Greek
polis, the Italian city-state, the Oceana of Harrington, Rousseau's
Republic of Geneva, or the American states-could maintain free
government and political equality.2 2 Thus, the single most audacious and original move of Madison and Hamilton in The Federalist was to reverse the weight of historical argument for free government and to insist that freedom is better secured through
government over a large territory.
Indeed, the great contribution of Madisonian liberalism was to
concede the inevitability of a multiplicity of factions in society
while redirecting the focus of political thought towards institutions
that could constrain and channel their "dangerous" tendencies."
Politics was no longer to be concerned with the Republican goal of
civic virtue or with the creation of small republics founded on a
20

Horwitz, 29 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. at 65 (cited in note 11); Garry Wills, Inventing

America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence 129-30, 209, 232, 254, 289 (1978).
" Wood, Creation at 499-500, 504.5, 527 (cited in note 13). The discussion was also
critical during the Revolutionary era. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 281-82, 288 (1973). Bailyn summarizes the ideas of Charles Inglis, who opposed the Declaration of Independence: "[P]opular governments can survive only in small
territories where inhabitants form a homogenous community with a unified economic interest." Id. at 288.
12 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975).
23 Federalist 10, in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed., The Federalist 129, 131-33 (1961).
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relatively homogeneous population. Conceptions of the legitimacy
of religious pluralism had emerged before those of political pluralism. And just as the proponents of religious toleration had urged
that the substance of a man's thoughts and the quality of his conscience were private and thus irrelevant to politics," so too did
Madisonian liberalism lead to the same privatized versions of political virtue. 25 The real novelty of Madisonian liberalism is in its
view that pluralism is either inevitable or desirable and that the
task of politics is to create institutions geared to accepting and
constraining that reality.
The triumph of Madisonian liberalism thus eventually produced the virtually exclusive institutionalist focus of American political thought as well as its "legalistic" mindset. Separation of
powers, judicial review, and federalism became the unquestioning
starting point for all subsequent political and constitutional reflection in America.
The substantive character of political culture and social relations were no longer the source of ideas about the good society.
Instead, the Newtonian mechanics of institutional balance became
the dominant mode of American political discourse." Process-oriented thought replaced substantive interest in the quality of political culture.
The result has been a tradition of political discourse that has
almost totally ignored the relationship between society and politics, the very question that was central to virtually all political theory at the time of the American Revolution. Indeed, by the late
nineteenth century it had developed into the dominant view of the
Lochner 7 court that there was no relevant relationship between
28
political and social equality.
This sharp distinction between the political and the social has
usually been structured in American legal thought in terms of the
public-private distinction" or, since the passage of the Civil War
24 See John Locke's four letters on toleration, in 6 The Works of John Locke (new ed.
corrected 1823).
25 See Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for
Capitalism before Its Triumph 129-30 (1977) (discussing the civic virtue of pursuing private
economic interests as a feature of liberalism generally, not simply Madisonian liberalism).
28 Michael Kammen, A Machine that Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American
Culture 16-19 (1986).
21 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) ("No doubt, wherever the right of private
property exists, there must and will be inequalities of fortune .... ).
29 See articles collected in University of Pennsylvania Law Review symposium on the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.Penn.L.Rev. 1289 (1982).
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Amendments, around the question of state action. The Lochner
court increasingly articulated conceptions of neutrality which took
the liberal state of political culture as "given" and, now, beyond
fundamental change.,30 Thus, social inequality or discrimination
were irrelevant to questions involving the public sphere. For example, the only reason why blacks felt stigmatized by separate but
equal facilities, according to Plessy v. Fergusons1 was that they
had "chosen" to put such an invidious interpretation on otherwise
"neutral" social preferences.
But nevertheless the one area in which the American liberal
tradition has never been entirely able to suppress the relevance of
political culture has been race."2 Slavery was regarded as a social
disease that undermined free institutions by many antebellum
thinkers,33 not only abolitionists. And since the decision in Brown
v. Board of Education3 4 it once again has been impossible entirely
to separate social domination from political domination.
From this perspective, the Warren Court can be seen to have
reintroduced political culture into mainstream legal thought for
the first time since the debate over slavery and the subsequent
marginalization of a Republican vision with the defeat of Reconstruction. The Warren Court also drew on the earlier efforts of Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism 5 to insist that legal
rules cannot be evaluated outside of a social context. The Brandeis
Brief, 6 which defended the constitutionality of maximum hour
laws for women in terms of the social reality of factory work for
women, was a forerunner of the controversial footnote in Brown
describing the sociological effects of segregation on black school
children. 7 Similarly, the unwillingness of the Supreme Court in
so Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1825, 1826-27 (1987).
S Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).

32 Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14
Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 599, 608-9 (1979) ("At the foundation of the liberal emphasis on individualism is the view that the only legitimate criteria for judging an individual are his own
energy and ability.... [Yet] [r]ace in this country has always stood as a constant reminder
of the fact that each individual is not judged solely as an individual.").
3' David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1790-1823
(1975).
34 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3' Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory 74-94 (1973) (discussing
ideas advanced by Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism).
3' Louis D. Brandeis, Brief For Defendant In Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908), in Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, eds., Landmark Briefs And Arguments Of
The Supreme Court Of The United States: Constitutional Law 63-178 (1975).
3" Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11 (cited in note 34).
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Shelley v. Kraemer s to uphold racially restrictive covenants on
the basis of the public-private distinction is a forerunner of many
Warren Court decisions watering down the state action requirement for funding unconstitutional discrimination. The Court's understanding of the existence of a systemic culture of racism rejected any appeal to "neutral principles" based on a supposed
sharp separation between discrimination in public and private
realms.
After Brown, many of the most important decisions of the
Warren Court can be understood as a rediscovery of the inseparable connection between political culture and political equality. The
recognition of the claims of women, of sexual, religious and cultural minorities, of the marginal and the outcast-illegitimates,
aliens, prisoners, criminal defendants, indigents, the homeless, welfare recipients-reflects an understanding of the negative connection between social oppression and political freedom.
The resistance to such an understanding eontinues not only
throughout the abstract universalism of the neo-Kantian tradition 9 but through the continuing vitality of the public-private distinction and the refusal inherent in it to understand oppression as
structural and systemic-in a word, as rooted in culture.
Thus, one can see the Warren Court as transforming the cultural premises of American liberalism in much the same way as
early Progressive legal thought transformed its economic premises.
Just as "freedom of contract" can be understood not as freedom at
all but as an organized form of domination of the weak by the
strong, so too, for example, does discrimination come to be understood not as the exercise of random, individualized, social preferences but as a structured cultural form, not very different from
state action itself.
Just as corporate concentration at the turn of the century undermined any convincing distinction between private power and
public, the rise of a mass media culture forces us to abandon ideas
of the private character of speech-and of pornography-that
emerged in an earlier age under more decentralized forms of
38 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) ("We have no doubt that there has been
state action in these cases in the full and complete sense of the phrase ....
[B]ut for the
active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners [as purchasers of property from willing sellers] would have been free to occupy the
properties in question without restraint.").
38 For examples of recent work in this tradition, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985); Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981); Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (1978).
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communication.
The rediscovery of political culture has thus revived all of the
issues that began to be marginalized with the triumph of Madisonian liberalism. It may even be imaginable that, a century and a
half later, America will finally bring forth its own Tocqueville, who,
inspired by the Republican tradition, will seek once again to understand the relationship between culture and democracy.

